

The Necessity for the Humanities in Psychology

The Psychologist and His/Her Shadow

Robert D. Romanyszyn

QUERY SHEET

This page lists questions we have about your paper. The numbers displayed at left can be found in the text of the paper for reference. In addition, please review your paper as a whole for correctness.

- Q1:** Au: Please add Reference for the Sprat 1667 citation/quote.
- Q2:** Au: Please add page number for Romanyszyn, 1982 quote.
- Q3:** Au: May 1958 not in References. Should it be May et al.? If not, please provide a reference for May, 1958 or delete citation.
- Q4:** Au: No J. R. Romanyszyn 2011 in References (check year). Please provide reference.
- Q5:** Au: Please provide English translation for van den Berg, 1959.
- Q6:** Au: Please provide English translation for van den Berg, 1961a.
- Q7:** Au: Please provide English translation for van den Berg, 1968.

TABLE OF CONTENTS LISTING

The table of contents for the journal will list your paper exactly as it appears below:

The Necessity for the Humanities in Psychology: The Psychologist and His/Her Shadow
Robert D. Romanyszyn

The Necessity for the Humanities in Psychology

The Psychologist and His/Her Shadow

Robert D. Romanyshyn
Pacifica Graduate Institute

5

PRELUDE

In this play before the article begins, I want to draw the reader's attention to two points. First, the subtitle of the article is a sort of confession. It is intended to signal to the reader that I approach the role of the humanities in psychological education as not only critically necessary, but also as one that is increasingly ignored, marginalized, forgotten, repressed and condemned to linger in the shadows that haunt our discipline. 10

Second, because the word *psychology* derives from the Greek word *Ψυχολογία*, which translates as the logos of soul, I am inclined to use the term soul in reference to the discipline of psychology. But, because the word has no place in psychology and also carries so many unexamined assumptions that would seriously misunderstand its classical meanings, its use in this article would require an article in its own right. Thus, in the article where the word would belong, I substitute the phrase *psychological life*, which, although less elegant, is equally accurate.¹ 15

INTRODUCTION

In the context of the current initiative in the APA to define psychology as a STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) discipline, making a case for the liberal arts/humanities in psychology is urgent. It is urgent because this definition leaves out of psychology those aspects of psychological life that make us most essentially human. As a STEM discipline, psychology will secure precision in its methods and forms of praxis at the price of giving us a picture of psychological life that is incomplete and dangerously so. Conceptualizing the 20

¹James Hillman is largely responsible for reintroducing the term in psychology. His vast span of work is a cogent defense of soul as the middle third that has fallen out of psychological discourse. Hillman is quite clear that by soul he does not mean a substance. On the contrary soul is a process whereby an event becomes an experience. With soul, imagination as a way of knowing also returns. Still the best introduction to his work is the classic text *Re-Visioning Psychology* (Hillman, 1975). See also my *Ways of the Heart Essays toward an Imaginal Psychology* (Romanyshyn, 2002).

Correspondence should be addressed to Robert D. Romanyshyn, Pacifica Graduate Institute, 249 Lambert Road, Carpinteria, CA 93013. E-mail: rromanyshyn@pacific.edu

syntactical rules of psychological life, it will miss the semantic ambiguity of it, leaving us in that 25
dubious position described by the poet e. e. cummings (1959) when he wrote:

since feeling is first
who pays any attention
to the syntax of things
will never wholly kiss you (p. 35). 30

These words of e. e. cummings make me wonder if the discipline of psychology, from its modern inception to the STEM initiative today, has lost the erotic embrace of psychological life.

The case I make in this article for the humanities in psychology and as a response to its definition in terms of STEM follows two paths. The first one, which draws on hermeneutics, focuses on the contextual element of psychological life and the second one, which draws on 35
phenomenology, focuses on the issue of embodiment.

PATH ONE HERMENEUTICS: THE CULTURAL-HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFE

In a recent and fascinating book, *Proust was a Neuroscientist*, Jonah Lehrer (2008) states how one of the surprising results of the Human Genome Project was that it “forced molecular 40
biology to focus on how our genes interact with the real world.” “Our cells, in dialogue with our environment,” he writes, “feed back to our DNA, changing the way we read ourselves.” DNA “is a code that requires context.” For Lehrer, “Life is a dialectic”, and even the brain, that holy grail of hope in psychology to reduce the epiphanies of psychological life to their neurological causes, has to give way to research that shows that “experience shapes the brain” 45
(pp. 45–46).

Lehrer gives an excellent example of this point about context. In a series of beautiful studies on bird brains, Fernando Nottebohm showed that neurogenesis—the making of new neurons in the brain—was a necessary condition for bird song and in his work he discovered that stress 50
impeded neurogenesis. Birds that were kept in their metal cages and thus deprived of their natural social context showed far less new neural development. Nottebohm, therefore, studied birds in their natural habitat outside the artificial context of the laboratory. Reflecting on his findings he said, “Take nature away and all your insight is in a biological vacuum” (Lehrer 2008, pp. 45–46).

If we make a place for such observations regarding bird brains, might we not begin to wonder 55
if the most valuable offspring of psychology’s love affair with neuroscience will not be the new facts that are uncovered, but the philosophical shift that those new facts will require? If even at the micro level of our genes we are a being-in-context, then at the macro level of behavior and experience must not psychology acknowledge that cultural-historical contexts shape and inform human action? If the caged bird does not sing so well, then what songs does psychology sing 60
about the psychological life of humanity if it ignores those contexts of culture and history, which record the myths, stories, ideas, artistic, political, economic, scientific, etc. creations of the human mind, and for which education in the humanities/liberal arts is essential? The STEM song that psychology sings seems woefully out of tune with these contexts of psychological life.

Hermeneutics is that discipline that attends to the context of understanding. Although I 65
 assume in this article that the basic themes of hermeneutics are generally understood, I do want
 to make the point that beyond being a method of inquiry hermeneutics becomes an ontological
 description of our way of being in the world in the work of Martin Heidegger and Hans
 Georg-Gadamer. (Palmer, 1969) As an ontological matter, understanding is not an act of subject- 70
 ivity, something one does. Rather, it is a fore-structure within which a dialectical process
 between presence that simultaneously shows and conceals itself and meaning continuously
 unfold and change within history, language and over time. Understanding, and the work of
 interpretation that goes with it, is foundational to being human. As such, hermeneutics informs
 and is at work in all disciplines from the humanities to the sciences.

In this article, I briefly discuss three variations of hermeneutics in psychology each of which 75
 shows the necessity for the humanities/liberal arts in psychological education.

Social Constructionism

Philip Cushman's hermeneutics is called social constructionism and in his book, *Constructing the 80
 Self, Constructing America* (1995), he presents eight basic propositions of this approach.
 Because his paper is part of this collection, I do not spell out in detail these eight points but limit
 myself to a brief summary of and riff on the first two principles.

First, human beings do not have a fixed nature that transcends culture and history. Second, we 85
 are made within a web of cultural and historical forms that already focus our ways of under-
 standing the world. Within the context of these two propositions even the human body is not
 a fixed given thing, an object determined by genetic codes and biological processes. Rather 85
 as Cushman (1995) says, the human body is "constructed by social practices" (p. 18).

In *Psychological Life: From Science to Metaphor* (Romanyshyn, 1982) I illustrated this point 90
 with a thorough discussion of the work of the English physician William Harvey, who in 1628
 described the human heart as a pump. That today we identify the heart as a pump with what the
 heart really is forgets the cultural-historical context within which it was seen and even forgets 90
 that this context has been forgotten. As a consequence the way the human heart shows itself
 in the context of language where one might speak of his or her loneliness and sorrow in terms
 of a broken heart does not really matter compared with the matter of the heart as a material thing.
 Later I will show that recovering the contexts of our understanding of the biological facts of 95
 human embodiment as a cultural-historical perspective does not ignore, invalidate or otherwise
 dismiss these facts. Rather this work of remembering these contexts speaks to what in our human
 embodiment makes us most specifically human. "There is more to seeing than meets the
 eyeball," as the philosopher of science Norwood Hanson (1972, p. 7) pointed out. The eye that
 sees is the eye whose seeing is also a vision and as such the eye that the anatomist knows is the 100
 necessary condition but not the cause of that vision.

Imagine the shift that might happen in how we think about the relation of bios and psyche if 105
 introductory texts in psychology made a place for these words in the chapters on the eye. Then
 we might understand the profound psychological difference between the eye of the painter and
 the eye of the voyeur. Of course, although each of these ways of seeing needs the anatomical eye
 as a foundation for its particular vision, each of them takes up and transforms that foundation 105
 without transcending it. In the section on embodiment I will elaborate this remark and speak
 to its relevance regarding how we might revision our notions of illness and healing.

Before I move to my second example of hermeneutics in psychology, I want to make two other points about Cushman's work. In the context of his hermeneutics, the things of everyday life are more than mere objects. They are cultural artifacts and as such are invested with and carry a symbolic weight. Moreover, because these artifacts incarnate the values, ideals and beliefs of the society within which they were created, they "reinforce and reproduce the constellations of power, wealth, and influence that dominate that society" (Cushman, 1995, p. 19).

I think it is a fair and urgent question to ask here if the belief system that the APA has about psychology, that it is, for example, a science in the mold of the natural sciences with its attendant values of measurement, quantification, and the reduction of psychological life to its material causes, a position that it now reinforced by the STEM initiative, is an ideological expression of power. Such ideologies are nourished within an attitude of forward-looking progress that is stiff necked against that posture of a backward glance, which seeks to recover those forgotten cultural-historical contexts that have become taken for granted. As such, these ideologies become deeply rooted in inertial resistance against the work of remembering origins for the sake of a new beginning. It is a fair and urgent question, then, to ask if the STEM initiative is a continuation of a socially constructed way of understanding psychological life that has forgotten its cultural historical roots and which as a result perpetuates the loop within which the materialism of psychology, the medicalization of psychological illness, and the economic advantages that accrue to pharmaceutical companies and the insurance industry co-exist and sustain each other.

Cushman's social constructionism is a work against forgetting. It is a hermeneutic, which, in Cushman's revealing image for his work, requires the psychologist to read over the shoulder of the one whose psychological life is to be understood. Reading over the shoulder, the psychologist not only sees the contexts within which the person's psychological life makes sense, he/she makes those contexts more conscious for the individual and the culture. For the psychologist to read over the other's shoulder it is necessary for him/her to know the myths, beliefs, stories, films, political, economic, scientific and artistic ideas etc, that make up those contexts. The humanities and liberal arts are indispensable for this work and are, therefore, a necessary and essential part of any psychological education.

Metabletics

J. H. van den Berg's metabletics is a unique and original variation on hermeneutics. A Dutch phenomenological psychiatrist, van den Berg has developed his metabletic perspective over the course of fifty years and through more than twenty volumes. The term metabletics describes his theory of changes, and although his work has been sadly neglected in American psychology in large part because so much of his work remains un-translated into English, one of his key metabletic books, *The Changing Nature of Man* (van den Berg, 1961b), has had a deep influence on the phenomenological movement in American psychology. More recently I edited a special edition of the journal *Janus Head* which gives a good introduction to his work and includes an interview with him. In the closing moments of that interview van den Berg reiterates one of his enduring concerns. He says, "I only hope that not only scientists or scholars but also laymen become aware that modern science cannot explain the essential problems of man." Continuing, he adds, "We need something else, a new grammar. In our modern era of successful science and

technology—successful only for a certain range of problems—we lack the words to grasp and to understand the wonder of nature’’ (p. 383). 150

For a phenomenologist the natural and the cultural-historical worlds are mirrors that reflect the sense of who we are. The world as van den Berg has noted is the home, the habitat of our subjectivity and thus to understand the person one must understand his/her world. His book *A Different Existence* (van den Berg, 1972) is an inspiring demonstration of this point in the context of psychopathology as is his small but profound description of the experience of illness in *The Psychology of the Sickbed* (van den Berg, 1966). In these and many other works he illustrates how context shapes a world of experience and how without giving it its place one’s understanding remains not only incomplete but also invalid. To give only one example, the illness that is disclosed under a microscope belongs to a second order of explanation that is already removed from the first order of experience. In this first order one’s illness displays its meanings through changes in the spatiality and temporality of one’s existence as well as in the shifts in one’s relatedness to one’s embodiment and to others. 155 160

It is obvious that Cushman’s and van den Berg’s hermeneutics converge and indeed Cushman acknowledges van den Berg’s influence on his work. Both acknowledge as essential the cultural and historical contexts of human life and each recognizes the mutability of these contexts. But van den Berg emphasizes this point and makes the changing character of psychological life the key to his work. So, for example, he begins *The Changing Nature of Man* with this provocative statement: 165

The whole science of psychology is based on the assumption that man does not change. Whereas, in traditional psychology, the life of a previous generation is seen as a variation on a known theme, the supposition that man does change leads to the thought that earlier generations lived a different sort of life, and that they were essentially different (van den Berg, 1961, pp. 7–8). 170

Van den Berg’s (1959, 1961, 1968) emphasis on the changing nature of psychological life is played out in a series of original, daring and scholarly studies on the changing nature of matter and the changing nature of the body. In these studies he practices Cushman’s reading over the shoulder. But in his reading van den Berg places himself differently. Defining his practice in terms of several principles, he begins his reading by returning to what he calls the principle of the unique event, which he describes as an origin point where and when a radical change in human existence is beginning to show itself, a shift that is recognizable through the ways in which the change is amplified through the ripples it evokes in other dimensions of human existence. The other two principles involved here are the principle of emphasis and the principle of simultaneity. To cite only one example, van den Berg considers how the changes in church architecture in western culture and history, from, for example, the Renaissance to the Baroque or from the Gothic to the Renaissance occur at the same time as changes in mathematics and changes in the meaning and practice of spirituality. 180 185

To practice this way of understanding the changing nature of human psychological life requires that one be educated in more than information and technique. One has to have an education that nurtures the capacity for imagination, a broad and general education nurtured by the humanities with a special emphasis on that kind of sensibility that teaches one how to read between the lines and below the surface of cultural-historical contexts to decipher the latent and subtle traces of psychological life as it discloses itself in all aspects of human life. In this 190

regard, maybe a psychologist has to accept the fact the he/she is a nonspecialist, and that psychology is not so much a discipline with a specific content but a style of being. One has to give up psychology for the sake of being psychological. The STEM initiative is the polar opposite of this position, an education which in its drive to be ever more precise in its measurements and explanations of psychological life loses touch with understanding the contextual meanings of psychological life. Maybe a broader education in psychology begins with knowing the history of one's discipline, not as a series of facts, nor as an illustration of progress made from error to truth, but as the changing faces of psychological life within the contexts of their epiphanies.

Complex Hermeneutics

Complex hermeneutics is another variation on hermeneutics whose name reveals its origins in the dialogue between van den Berg's metabletic phenomenology with its commitment to the dialectical relation between person and world and depth psychology's commitment to the complex unconscious depths of that relation. In *The Wounded Researcher* (Romanyshyn, 2007) I applied this hermeneutic approach to the praxis of research in psychology, making a case for it as a necessary supplement to other research approaches and their methods. As a supplement, I situated this approach within the twentieth century movements within psychology and the sciences to bring the researcher into the research process by developing procedures that take into account the complex and dynamic unconscious factors in that process. "The wounded researcher: Making a place for unconscious dynamics in the research process" (Romanyshyn, 2010), which appeared in this journal, presented a summary of that approach and its application to research.

Complex hermeneutics also makes the case that education in psychology has to foster a metaphoric sensibility, which is attuned to the play of language and its rich symbolic depths. A metaphoric sensibility, which is fostered by exposure to the humanities and the liberal arts, is necessary as a counter weight to the literal mindedness of so much of psychology's language. A metaphoric sensibility cultivates a way of thinking and speaking that makes a place for the capacity to tolerate mystery, ambiguity and doubt without any irritable reaching after fact and reason, which is the poet John Keats description of negative capability (cited in Romanyshyn, 2002, p. 120) It nourishes a deep sense of openness to the living heritage of language alongside psychology's addiction to the ideal of precision, a term that requires a language that cuts experience to suit its agendas, a language whose deadly seriousness can make one feel seriously dead to the complex and rich mysteries of psychological life.

This call for a metaphoric sensibility in psychology has been a primary theme in my work beginning with the publication in 1981 of *Psychological Life: From Science to Metaphor* (Romanyshyn, 1982). In that book I contrasted that kind of sensibility with a literal minded sensibility and showed how that latter style was advocated early on in the history of the emergence of the natural sciences. In 1667, for example, Thomas Sprat, in his *History of the Royal Society* wrote the following words in praise of its scientific members:

They have therefore been most vigorous in putting in execution, the only Remedy, that can be found for this extravagance: and that has been, a constant Resolution, to reject all the amplifications, digressions, and swelling of style; to return back to the primitive purity, and shortness, when men delivered

Q1 so many things, almost in an equal number of words. They have exacted from all of their members, a close, naked, natural way of speaking; positive expressions; clear senses; a natural easiness: bringing all things as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can (p. 175). 235

Commenting on this passage, I noted the proximity of Sprat's words to the work of William Harvey, himself a member of the Royal Academy, and the English physician who, in his description of the heart as a pump, emphasized that moment when the heart is empty of blood. I suggested that in this context Sprat's words amounted to a kind of campaign to empty language of its apparent un-natural indirections that are a hallmark of metaphor, which does not define its meaning with anything remotely approaching mathematical plainness, but which alludes to meaning in an elliptically elusive fashion. That the word campaign proved to be an apt choice was confirmed when I discovered that in 1670 Samuel Parker went "so far as to advocate an Act of Parliament forbidding the use of 'fulsome and luscious metaphors'" (Romanyshyn, 1982). 240

Q2 The STEM initiative seems to be within that same spirit, continuing that literal minded way of thinking that has been a hallmark of the natural sciences from their late 15th century origins to the beginnings of their transformation near the end of the 19th and the early years of the 20th centuries (see Romanyshyn, 1989) Defining psychological education in terms of science, technology, engineering and mathematics, it would take its measure of psychological life in terms of what can be measured, quantified and analyzed and thereby empty psychological life of its complex metaphoric epiphanies and expressions. 245

The intention in complex hermeneutics to make a place for unconscious dynamics in the bodies of knowledge we construct along with its advocacy for the development of a metaphoric sensibility questions that spirit and doing so aligns itself with the spirit of a postmodern frame of mind. J.-F. Lyotard's critique of modernity aptly describes this postmodern frame: 255

The modern is all too easily snapped up by the future, by all the values of pro-motion, pro-gram, pro-gress dominated by a very strong emphasis on willful activism. Whereas the postmodern implies in its very movement . . . a capacity to listen openly to what is hidden within the happenings of today. Postmodernism is deeply reflexive, in the sense of anamnesis or reminiscence, and that itself evinces what is best in modernity (cited in Kearney, 1988, p. 27). 260

Commenting on Lyotard's work, Richard Kearney adds:

Postmodernism . . . assumes the task of reinvestigating the crisis and trauma at the very heart of modernity; the postmodern now being understood as a testament to the fact that the end of modernity is . . . a symptom as it were of its own unconscious infancy which needs to be retrieved and reworked if we are not to be condemned to an obsessional fixation upon, and compulsive repetition of, the sense of its ending. In this respect, the task of a postmodern imagination might be to envision the end of modernity as a possibility of rebeginning (Kearney, 1988, p. 27). 265

Social constructionism, metabletics and complex hermeneutics are all a work against forgetting. At their core they are that work of anamnesis, that disciplined work of return through history, philosophy, art and literature for the sake of remembering the origins of those cultural-historical contexts that not only have been the foundation of our scientific-technological world view, but also have shaped our sense of psychological life as an interior domain of experience apart from nature and the world and as a science of behavior to be observed, measured, quantified 270

and explained. And, although I have in all this work appreciated the science of psychology in terms of what it does reveal of psychological life, I have also been concerned with what that view conceals of psychological life, what it leaves in the shadows, ignores, forgets and even forgets that it forgets: the rich symbolic character of psychological life which in its subtle, non quantifiable, non reducible forms expresses a perennial wisdom that is the province of the humanities and the liberal arts. 275

The STEM initiative makes psychology a dangerous anachronism for within those forgotten contexts psychology, adrift from its own foundations in the fertile and ever shifting symbolic expressions of psychological life in the cultural-historical sweep of the humanities and liberal arts, holds before itself an image of humanity that is less than fully human. That image is grounded in psychology's understanding of human embodiment. 280 285

PATH TWO: PHENOMENOLOGY: THE EMBODIMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFE

The lived body is a central theme in phenomenology. It is the body that one *is* compared to the objective body one *has*. Developed in the works of such early pioneers as Erwin Straus, Medard Boss, Eugene Minkowski, Henri F. Ellenberger, Ludwig Binswanger, V. E. von Gebsattel, F. J. J. Butyendijk, and J. H. van den Berg among others, it was first introduced to an American audience with the work of Rollo May (1958) and the program in phenomenological psychology founded at Duquesne University in 1964. Of all these early pioneers it was, however, Maurice Merleau-Ponty who most advanced our understanding of the lived body, and whose work provides the best foundation for rethinking the presence of the body in psychology.² 290 295

In his first book, *The Structure of Behavior*, Merleau-Ponty (1942/1963) describes the lived body in terms of the theme of form and its unfolding in terms of three structures of behavior. By form Merleau-Ponty means a perceived difference among the three structures of behavior which is to be found neither within the organism nor the world. The forms made visible as these three structures are neither fixed and determinate material events nor logical categories of mind. A perceived difference, form is neither a thing nor a thought. Rather, form is the noticeable difference among the three structures each of which displays a preferred and typical style of behaving in and engaging and being engaged by the world. Form as displayed in each structure is a field and it is the field of forms that is primary. It precedes the dichotomy of organism and world and collapses that dichotomy in favor of a dialectical relation between them. As primary, form is the ground out of which a typical style of a being-having-relations-with-a-world emerges. Or to say this more organically, the field is the soil, the rhizome from which the terms body-world blossom. 300 305

For the syncretic structure the typical form of behaving is instinctual and is a display of what Merleau-Ponty further describes as the vital order. With the amovable structure the typical form is conditioned and it is also a display of the vital order of behaving. At the human order the symbolic structure is the typical form of behaving. 310

Although the disciplines of biology, physiology, and genetics have developed well beyond what was available to Merleau-Ponty in 1942, the philosophical ground that he cleared for psychology as a study of behavior is not only still valid, it is also, I would argue, even more

²For a detailed overview of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment and its application to the context of psychotherapy see Romanyshyn (2010).

essential today as indicated by the STEM initiative in psychology. Within that initiative, the differences among these structures are erased as psychology moves even more aggressively into causal, materialistic and reductive ways of explaining human behavior. This move is and should be a cause for deep concern not only because of the way in which it aligns psychology with and serves the interests of the pharmaceutical and health insurance industries aided and abetted by the advertising industry, but also because it fosters an ever increasing eclipse of what makes behavior specifically human.

The shift that form engenders away from causal toward dialectical thinking puts psychology on a path of return that acknowledges the symbolic form of psychological life. It does so by reimagining the relation among the three structures of behavior. Merleau-Ponty develops this relation within the context of Edmund Husserl's notion of *Fundierung*, and in a recent essay I illustrated this point with examples (Romanyshyn, 2011). To restate that argument here would unduly lengthen this article, and so I limit myself to one very simple but direct example, which vividly illustrates this paradoxical relation among the three structures.

The example is the behavior of winking. The meaning of wink, of course, is ambiguous. It is a symbolic act whose meaning depends upon the intention of the one who winks and the situation within which the wink happens. There is, for example, the conspiratorial wink that suggests a kind of insider knowledge between people who are in the know about something, and the flirtatious wink that invites the possibility of some intimacy. In each case, however, the wink depends upon the intact functioning of the anatomical eye, one of whose behaviors is blinking. The wink, we might say, depends upon the blink.

In Husserl's term of *Fundierung*, we would say that the blink as the *founding* biological action is primary in the sense that the wink as the *founded* symbolic action is given as an explicit form of the blink, which prevents the wink from ever transcending the blink as a condition of its possibility. This primacy of the blink, however, is not an empirical primacy in the sense that would allow one to reduce the meaning of the wink to the blink as its cause. Moreover, because the blink as a biological mechanism can be and also generally is conditioned by the social contexts in which one behaves, the same relation of the wink to the blink applies to those social contexts as it does to the biological conditions. In each case the wink as a symbolic expression shows that what makes us specifically human is the capacity to turn back to, recover, take up and transform the biological and social foundations of human behavior from *causes of* to *conditions for* action. The wink is the capacity for meaning to emerge from its being embedded within the contexts of biological mechanisms and social forces.

Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of form and the three structures of behavior indicates that meaning is an emergent property in human life.³ As such the relation among the three structures is neither causal nor linear and does not lend itself to reductive thinking in terms of mechanistic and conditioned explanations. In the symbolic wink the syncretic and amovable blink are present but in a new and novel form. The relation is one of preservation through transformation, which requires dialectical ways of thinking that frame explanations in organic terms.

³Emergence describes the growth of complexity in the natural world and living systems in terms of sudden changes or leaps in the process. The three structures of behavior can be understood in this way. In addition, his description of form as "the solution to the antinomy of which it is the occasion, the synthesis of matter and idea" (Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1963, p. 137) suggests a convergence between Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment and Jung's notion of the subtle body. See Romanyshyn (2011).

Psychology needs a new image of the human body and a way of understanding human embodiment that acknowledges the specifically symbolic character of human life. Although that small difference between blinking and winking opens a space for a psychology, which, founded upon meaning as an emergent property of human life, challenges the narrow and ill conceived STEM initiative, it does not dismiss that initiative. On the contrary, it preserves it by transforming it as a legitimate but incomplete perspective. Indeed, it is that small but vital difference in the example between blinking and winking that allows psychologists in the first place to take up the biological and social contexts of our thinking, which are conditions for thinking—an intact functioning brain and the social contexts of thought—and imagine them as causes of behavior. The STEM initiative is done by psychologists whose creative activity is itself an expression of the symbolic structure of behavior. Any psychology, STEM or otherwise, that would leave this psychologist out of the picture seems rather absurd.

A CASE FOR THE HUMANITIES

The relation among the structures of behavior is one of discontinuity where the difference between structures establishes the “conditions for a development by leaps or crises” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1963, p. 137). In this regard, we could understand the differences among the structures as quantum differences, as different energy states within which each structure is configured in a different way as it is integrated in a different order. Thus, the instinctual patterns of syncretic structures in the human order have a different meaning and appearance in the vital order, just as symbolic meanings in the vital order have a different meaning and appearance in the human one. The principle of discontinuity, therefore, is not a hierarchical principle of progress that would locate the symbolic structure only within the human order and imprison other species of animals within either the syncretic or amovable forms. Indeed, there are, “no species of animal whose behavior *never* goes beyond the syncretic level nor any whose behavior *never* descends below the symbolic forms” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1963, p. 104, italics in original).

The implication of this principle affects our understanding of the meaning of illness and health and makes a strong case for the humanities in psychological education. A patient with Parkinson’s disease, for example, is not just a mechanism in motion. In gait and posture the patient is expressing a way of being in the world, and the role of dopamine in movement is different here than it is within the syncretic and vital orders. It is a quantum difference that perhaps is best described as a limitation of one’s freedom. Indeed, in this regard, we can say that in the quantum leaps between the syncretic, amovable and symbolic forms there is an increasing amount of freedom from the conditions, whether biological or social, that organize behavior to the point where behavior in its expression is not guided by some norm but is the creation of a norm. Thus, although the lack of dopamine producing cells is the cause for the Parkinsonian movement, its integration within the symbolic order can transform that cause into a meaning. And yet although our lives are not determined by the forces of biological or historical circumstances, they are circumscribed within them. Our freedom is a bounded freedom.

That capacity for freedom to transform syncretic and amovable forms of behavior, bounded as it is, means that even within severe illness where laws of causality do apply, the work of healing requires that although one acknowledges the causal factors, one recognizes that one is not reduced to them. And in this work of healing the meds alone are not only not enough, they

are also not the most essential ingredient. On the contrary, it is the timeless stories, tales, myths, dramas, images, and characters that are inscribed and live within the humanities that are essential. Psychology needs to be healed of its own illness of which the STEM initiative is a symptom. It needs to integrate within its fantasy of psychological education in terms of science, technology, engineering and mathematics, an education of the imagination. The humanities and the liberal arts foster such an education.⁴ 400

In a final word I need to add that the STEM initiative in psychology is part of broader cultural crisis, where our collective image of what it means to be human is seriously endangered. Moreover, psychology is not only part of that larger crisis, it also, perhaps unwittingly, lends its weight to and supports the ideology of those contemporary cultural-historical forces that are leading toward not only educational impoverishment but also ecological and economic collapse. 405

REFERENCES

- cummings, e. e. (1959). *100 selected poems*. New York: Grove.
- Cushman, P. (1995). *Construction the self, constructing America: A cultural history of psychotherapy*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 410
- Hanson, N. (1972). *Patterns of discovery: An inquiry into the conceptual foundations of science*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Hillman, J. (1975). *Re-visioning psychology*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Kearney, R. (1988). *The wake of imagination*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lehrer, L. (2008). *Proust was a neuroscientist*. New York: Houghton Mifflin. 415
- May, R., Angel, E., & Ellenberger, H. F. (Eds.). (1958). *Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). *The structure of behavior* (A. L. Fisher, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press. (Original work published 1942)
- Palmer, R. E. (1969). *Hermeneutics*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 420
- Romanyshyn, J. R. (2011). *Chronicles from a myth-stical world*. Bloomington, IN: IUniverse, Inc.
- Romanyshyn, R. (1982). *Psychological life: From science to metaphor*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Romanyshyn, R. (1989). *Technology as symptom and dream*. London: Routledge.
- Romanyshyn, R. (2002). *Ways of the heart: Essays toward an imaginal psychology*. Pittsburgh, PA: Trivium.
- Romanyshyn, R. (2007). *The wounded researcher: Research with soul in mind*. New Orleans: Spring Journal Books. 425
- Romanyshyn, R. (2010). The wounded researcher: Making a place for unconscious dynamics in the research process. *The Humanistic Psychologist*, 36, 275–304.
- Romanyshyn, R. (2011). The body in psychotherapy: Contributions of Merleau-Ponty. In R. Jones (Ed.), *Body, mind and healing after Jung: A space of questions*. London: Routledge.
- Q5 van den Berg, J. H. (1959). *Het menselijk lichaam* (Vol. 1). Nijkerk, The Netherlands: Callenbach. 430
- Q6 van den Berg, J. H. (1961a). *Het menselijk lichaam* (Vol. 2). Nijkerk, The Netherlands: Callenbach.
- van Den Berg, J. H. (1961b). *The changing nature of man*. New York: Dell.
- van den Berg, J. H. (1966). *The psychology of the sickbed*. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
- Q7 van den Berg, J. H. (1968). *Metabletika van de materie*. Nijkerk, The Netherlands: Callenbach.
- van den Berg, J. H. (1972). *A different existence*. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. 435

⁴I chose the example of Parkinsons disease because I have had a direct experience of how the causal factors in the illness are indeed capable of being transformed into a symbolic act of meaning. My oldest son Jeffrey, who was first diagnosed with it twenty years ago at the age of twenty-four has recently published an epic poem that poignantly tells the tale of a life he had imagined for himself (2010). The work took fifteen years but along that long path he was transforming his ‘wound’ into a work.

Q4

AUTHOR NOTE

Robert D. Romanyshyn is a teacher, writer, and psychotherapist trained in phenomenology and Jungian psychology. An Affiliate Member of the Inter-Regional Society of Jungian Analysts, he is a senior core faculty member of the Clinical Psychology Program at Pacifica Graduate Institute. Author of six books, including *The Wounded Researcher* (2007), over forty book chapters, and numerous journal articles, he has given keynote addresses at international conferences, and presented lectures and directed workshops at universities and professional societies in the United States, Canada, Europe, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. *Antarctica: Inner journeys in the Outer World*, available on line at www.jungplatform.com, is a multimedia psychological reflection on the melting polar ice. Web site: www.RobertRomanyshyn.com.

440

445